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Abstract
Whilst the Internal Market has been operational for decades, the free
movement of defence products within the EU has been restricted by
national licensing practices. Member States have treated “intra-EU”
transfers as equivalent to third country exports. The Intra-Community
Transfers Directive (ICT) introduced a harmonized transfer regime. This
article provides a first legal analysis and a case study of the challenges
facing harmonization where an evolving Internal Market competence
meets a diversity of national security and other interests. The ICT
constitutes a significant first step towards reducing barriers to trade, but
an ambivalent approach to minimum harmonization has impacted its
effectiveness; legal reform is required to further this objective.
1. Introduction
Member States have historically restricted the free movement of defence
products within the EU. Law and practice in this field appears to operate in a
parallel universe in which the Internal Market does not exist. National
licensing laws and policies have treated “intra-Union” transfers, that is, the
transmission or movement of a defence-related product from a supplier in one
Member State to a recipient in another,1 as equivalent to exports to third
countries outside the EU. A principal concern is that the absence of controls
on transfers within the EU could exacerbate risks of illicit exports outside the
EU, threatening national security and foreign policy. Disproportionate
* University of Birmingham and University of Bristol, respectively. Thanks to Phil Syrpis
andAlbert Sánchez Graells,Anthony Arnull, Baudouin Heuninckx, and participants at the 46th
UACES Conference in Bilbao, Sept. 2015, for comments on a previous version of this article.
Any mistakes, however, are ours.
1. Based on the definition of “transfer” in Art. 3(2) Directive 2009/43/EC of the European
Parliament and of the Council of 6 May 2009 simplifying terms and conditions of transfers of
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licensing requirements have incurred significant costs and delays, creating
barriers to trade. However, in 2009 the EU adopted its “Defence Package”, a
key component of which is the Intra-Community Transfers Directive (ICT)
2009/43/EC introducing a harmonized transfer licensing and certification
regime.2
This article addresses an important gap in existing literature by offering a
legal analysis of the ICT.3 It also argues that recent proposals for further
harmonization through “soft-law” Recommendations are insufficient and that
legal reform of the ICT is necessary to enable minimum harmonization. This
argument is made in light of a recent Commission-authorized study tasked to
assess the ICT’s impact, which concluded that, whilst widespread variable
implementation has limited the Directive’s impact in practice, there is no
strong interest among authorities and industry for legal reform and that further
harmonization should be pursued through soft-law guidance.4 In late 2016,
the Commission published a Communication based largely on this study
adopting two Recommendations for further harmonization which do not,
however, entail legal reform.5 This article begins by examining transfers in
2. The “Defence Package” consists of: the ICT Directive, Directive 2009/81/EC of the
European Parliament and of the Council of 13 July 2009 on the coordination of procedures for
the award of certain works contracts, supply contracts and service contracts by contracting
authorities or entities in the fields of defence and security; and amending Directives
2004/17/EC and 2004/18/EC, O.J. 2009, L 216/76 (“ICT”) and Commission Communication,
“A Strategy for a stronger and more competitive European defence industry”, COM(2007)764
final. See Trybus, Buying Defence and Security in Europe: the EU Defence and Security
Procurement Directive in Context (Cambridge University Press, 2014); and Heuninckx, “The
EU Defence and Security Procurement Directive: Trick or treat?” 20 Public Procurement Law
Review (2011), 9. For an overview of the ICT in a legal context, see Trybus ibid., pp. 139–156.
3. For the political science/security studies literature, see Masson, Marta, Léger and
Lundmark, “The ‘Transfer Directive’: Perceptions in European countries and
recommendations”, Fondation pour la recherche stratégique, No. 04/2010; Mölling, “Options
for an EU regime on intra-Community transfers of defence goods” in Keohane (Ed.), Towards
a European Defence Market, Chaillot Paper No. 113 (EU Institute of Security Studies, 2008)
and Ingels, “The Intra-EU Defence Trade Directive: Positive Goals” in Bailes, Depauw and
Baum (Eds.) The EU Defence Market: Balancing Effectiveness with Responsibility (Flemish
Peace Institute, 2011).
4. Commission, Evaluation of Directive 2009/43/EC on the Transfers of defence-related
products within the Community Final Report (prepared by Technopolis) June 2016 (published
7 Oct. 2016) (hereinafter “Technopolis report”), esp. at 73. The authors were interviewed for
this Report: Appendix E, 102, Table 39.
5. Cf. Report from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council, Evaluation
of Directive 2009/43/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 6 May 2009
simplifying terms and conditions of transfers of defence-related products within the
Community, COM(2016)760 final (30 Nov. 2016); Commission Recommendation of 30 Nov.
2016 on the harmonization of the scope and conditions for general transfer licences for armed
forces and contracting authorities as referred to in point (a) of Article 5(2) of Directive
2009/43/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council, C(2016)7711 final; and
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their historical economic, political and legal context (section 2).6 It then
analyses the ICT’s scope (section 3), transfers and licences (section 4),
end-use controls (section 5), and certification (section 6)7 before offering
conclusions (section 7).
2. Context
The defence industries of several EU Member States are part of a global
armaments market in which, in 2014, the top 100 defence producers sold
goods and services worth US$401 billion.8 Companies in the so-called “Big
Six” Member States, i.e. France, Germany, Italy, Spain, Sweden and the UK,
sell to their respective governments, to a lesser extent to other Member States,
and export to third countries.9 Further, most Member States have at least niche
capacities and participate in European and global supply chains. Therefore,
the ability to transfer defence products expeditiously with proportionate
Commission, Recommendation of 30 Nov. 2016 on the harmonization of the scope of and
conditions for general transfer licences for certified recipients as referred to in Article 9 of
Directive 2009/43/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council, C(2016)7728 final. The
Commission Staff Working Document SWD(2016)398 final/2 (7 Dec. 2016) accompanying
COM(2016)760 final does not go beyond the findings of the Technopolis report, ibid.
6. Drawing on: UNISYS, “Intra-Community Transfers of Defence Products”, Final Report
of the Study “Assessment of Community initiatives related to intra-Community transfers of
defence products”, Brussels, Feb. 2005 (for the Commission) (hereinafter “UNISYS report”)
(no longer publicly available but retained on file); and Commission Staff Working Document,
“Accompanying document to the Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the
Council on simplifying terms and conditions of transfers of defence-related products within the
Community” (hereinafter “Impact Assessment”), SEC(2007)1593.
7. Cf. Report from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council on
transposition of Directive 2009/43/EC simplifying terms and conditions for transfer of
defence-related products within the EU, COM(2012)359 final (hereinafter “Transposition
Report”); Mampaey, Moreau, Quéau and Seniora, Final Report, “Study on the Implementation
of Directive 2009/43/EC on Transfers of Defence-related Products”, Group for Research and
Information on Peace and Security (hereinafter “GRIP study”) (prepared for the Commission)
2014; European Parliament Directorate-General for External Policies Policy Department’s
Report “The impact of the ‘defence package’ Directives on European Defence” (2015);
Technopolis report supra note 4, and SWD(2016)398 final/2. Information was also collected
during semi-structured interviews conducted with officials in the UK Department for Business,
Innovation and Skills and informal discussions with German officials.
8. Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) Press Release, 14 Dec. 2014:
<www.sipri.org/media/pressreleases/2014/SIPRI-Top-100-December-2014> (last visited 30
Jan. 2017). The list contains many EU-based companies. The European defence industries have
an estimated annual turnover of ¤55 billion and employ approximately 300,000 people. See also
2007 figures in COM(2007)764, at 2, also indicating that 20 years ago these figures were
almost twice as high.
9. For a discussion of this grouping, see Trybus, op. cit. supra note 2, p. 26.
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controls is an important contributor to the competitiveness and, indeed,
survival of the European defence industries.
2.1. The status quo ante: Intra-Union transfers prior to the ICT
For many years, the Commission has sought to prioritize intra-Union transfers
as part of the development of a more competitive EU defence market.10
However, there had been no general EU-wide regime for the intra-Union
transfer of defence-related products.11 Member States instituted their own
national laws and policies, which formally treated intra-EU transfers and third
country exports without distinction.12 National ex ante export licences
were required in both instances.13 To this extent, national rules were not
specifically adapted to differentiate Internal Market law obligations and any
other legal obligations with regard to exports. Thus, measures that might
otherwise be appropriate for export risks, such as potential diversion to third
parties involved in conflict or terrorism, were equally applied to transfers to
allied and generally peaceful Member States within an integrated EU. This
absence of free movement was criticized not least by the European defence
industries.14
Whilst licence applications for export to other EU or NATO members were
most likely subject to less scrutiny than exports to other countries,15 the formal
existence of many different laws was, in itself, “a serious burden for
intra-[Union] transfers” exacerbated by their publication alongside licensing
policies (if published) in different languages.16 Further, Member States used
different national and international lists for the control of armaments to
determine the scope of coverage of licences.17 Most national laws did not
specify detailed or transparent licensing criteria.18 Determinations were,
10. COM(1996)10 final, at 19; COM(1997)583 final, Annex I, Art.5; Annex II; and
COM(2003)113 final, at 13.
11. By contrast, see Council Regulation 428/2009/EC setting up a Community regime for
the control of exports, transfer, brokering and transit of dual-use items (recast) O.J. 2009, L
134/1.
12. Impact Assessment, supra note 6, at 4 and most recently COM(2016)760 final, at 3.
13. UNISYS report, supra note 6, at 12; Impact Assessment, ibid., at 13.
14. See Antonini, the President of the European Defence Industries Group, “Political
Harmonisation and Consolidation”, EMP conference on the Future of the European Defence
Industry, Brussels, 10–11 Dec. 2003 as cited in UNISYS report, ibid., at 80.
15. Masson, Marta, Léger, and Lundmark, op. cit. supra note 3, at 18. For a useful analysis
of national licensing regimes prior to the ICT, see ibid., at pp. 15–32 and UNISYS report, ibid.,
at 8–36 and Annex D.
16. UNISYS report, ibid., at 12 also at 59 and 64.
17. Ibid., at 9. See also Mölling, op. cit. supra note 3, at 58.
18. UNISYS report, ibid., at 61.
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therefore, at the absolute discretion of licensing authorities.19 Moreover,
certain national laws required that additional (pre-)licences be obtained or a
fee paid before licences could be approved.20 The processes for certifying
reliable defence companies also varied.21 Finally, licences could be obtained
for several years covering multiple shipments or required for every single
shipment.22 Time limits for licence expirations also varied.23 Resulting
administrative burdens generated long lead times up to several months.24 Even
companies transferring components between subsidiaries located in several
countries had to comply with variable regimes.25 It is difficult to assess the
indirect costs of controls on the defence industries overall, but the direct costs
amount to hundreds of millions of euros.26 These costs are stark considering
that in 2003, out of 12,627 licence applications,27 only 15 were refused, all in
the Baltic States.28 Whilst licensing measures may exceptionally be justified
(see section 4 below), the above indicates that licensing practices have
generally been disproportionate to control needs.29
Some momentum towards liberalization resulted from the 1998
intergovernmental Letter of Intent (LoI) initiative, to which the “Big-Six”
defence industrial Member States are currently signatories.30 Attempts had
been made to introduce the “Global Project Licence” removing the need for
specific authorizations to transfer products between LoI partners participating
in collaborative projects.31 However, the LoI initiative has not been fully
19. Impact Assessment, supra note 6, at 14.
20. UNISYS report, supra note 6, at 61; Impact Assessment, supra note 6, at 14.
21. Mölling, op. cit. supra note 3, at 59.
22. UNISYS report, supra note 6, at 62.
23. Ibid.
24. Ibid., at 5; Impact Assessment, supra note 6, at 14 and Mölling, op. cit. supra note 3, at
61–62, 68.
25. Impact Assessment, supra note 6, at 4.
26. UNISYS report, supra note 6, at 112 estimates the indirect costs at ¤2.73 billion. The
estimated direct costs for the 12,627 licence procedures conducted in 2003 amounted to ¤238
million.
27. With an overall value of ¤8.9 billion for conventional defence products delivered
between the then 25 EU Member States: UNISYS report, ibid., at 94. This represents
approximately 31.4 % of all transfers, with the remainder being exports to third countries:
ibid., 95.
28. UNISYS report, ibid., at 94: six in Estonia, six in Latvia and three in Lithuania.
29. Impact Assessment, supra note 6, at 4 and 13.
30. Letter of Intent between the Defence Ministers of the UK, France, Germany, Italy, Spain
and Sweden on Measures to facilitate the Restructuring of the European Defence Industry
signed in London, 6 July 1998 (“LoI”). The LoI was formalized under a Framework Agreement
(“FA”) which entered into force on 2 Oct. 2003. For a general discussion of the LoI, see Trybus,
op. cit. supra note 2, at pp. 225–231.
31. Art. 7 FA.
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executed in practice and with limited results to date.32 In 2006, the EU
launched a Consultation Paper on intra-Community transfers.33 This
precipitated the 2007 Impact Assessment34 and proposal for a Directive.35
The status quowas rejected.The Commission opted for a Directive rather than
a Regulation based on the “primary responsibility” of Member States for
simplification of licensing and the general sensitivity of defence.36 On 6 May
2009, the ICT was adopted. Member States had until 30 June 2011 for
transposition (Art. 18(1)). However, national provisions did not have to enter
into effect until 30 June 2012, allowing a period in which to “foster mutual
trust” and evaluate progress based on a Commission report.37 In 2012, the
Commission reported incomplete transposition38 and initially launched
infringement proceedings against seven Member States.39 However, despite
these delays, all Member States have now formally transposed the ICT.40
2.2. Competence to regulate armaments and harmonization under the
TFEU
As transfers of defence products may implicate national security and foreign
policy, central issues are the EU’s competence to act and the nature and scope
of harmonization in this field.
2.2.1. Competence
The ICT was adopted under Article 114 TFEU (then 95 EC) which enables
EU legislation that harmonizes relevant national laws for the establishment
and functioning of the Internal Market.41 Harmonization is conventionally
understood as the institution of common EU rules to remove “lawful” barriers
to trade, that is, nationally diverse measures which are prima facie
incompatible with the TFEU but which could exceptionally be justified e.g.
32. Impact Assessment, supra note 6, at 9 and 18.
33. Commission, Consultation Paper on the Intra-Community Circulation of Products for
the Defence of Member States, 21 Mar. 2006, Brussels, ENTR/C.
34. Supra note 6.
35. Proposal for a directive on simplifying terms and conditions of transfers of
defence-related products within the Community, COM(2007)765 final.
36. Ibid., at 8.
37. See Recital 40 and Arts. 17(1) and 18(1) ICT.
38. The Transposition Report, supra note 7, at 15–19 reported in 2012 that 20 Member
States had fully transposed, one had partially done so, six were expectant and one had not
communicated transposition.
39. Transposition Report, ibid, at 5.
40. See COM(2016)760 final, at 2 and SWD(2016)398 final/2, at 14. Croatia joined the EU
only in 2013.
41. Preamble and Recital 43 ICT.
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on public health or security grounds.42 If a harmonization directive is enacted
to provide rules which protect such interests, recourse to these grounds is
precluded.43 If harmonization is not complete, however, Member States may
continue to have recourse to these grounds.44
It is clear that defence-related products are goods for the purposes of EU
law.45 Onerous licensing requirements may constitute measures having
equivalent effect to quantitative restrictions on exports contrary to Article 35
TFEU.46 The ICT considers harmonization to be necessary because “direct”
application of the free movement principles alone is insufficient to remove
national restrictions in light of their potential to be justified under Article 36
or 346 TFEU.47 In other words, the ICT recognizes the reality that licensing
measures remain, in principle, justifiable on public security and/or essential
national security grounds in exceptional circumstances.48 However, it seeks to
progressively eliminate certain licensing measures which do not justify
exclusion from EU Internal Market principles through a uniform minimum
EU licensing regime. This does not preclude Member States from continuing
to rely on exceptions within the ICT which limit its application based on such
security grounds, Article 36 TFEU to deviate from the ICT, or exempt other
national licensing measures from free movement principles under Internal
Market law. Nor does it preclude derogation from the TFEU altogether
pursuant to Article 346 TFEU. This provides a degree of flexibility necessary
to balance sensitive security interests against the discipline of the Internal
Market. The onus is now firmly on Member States to justify why those
interests cannot be sufficiently protected within the scope of the ICT, which
properly acknowledges the application of free movement principles to
licensing of defence products.
However, outstanding questions remain. Firstly, whilst the ICT indicates
that licensing measures have the “potential” to be justified, prior ECJ case law
had not provided a clear indication as to what kinds of measure can be
justified under Article 36 TFEU and the level of scrutiny to be applied. It is,
perhaps, surprising that Member States and suppliers have not previously
42. Alternatively, on the basis of the Cassis de Dijon mandatory requirements or
overriding public interest grounds as recognized in Case 120/78, REWE Zentrale AG v.
Bundesmonopolverwaltung für Branntwein, EU:C:1979:42 and subsequent case law.
43. Case 72/83, Commission v. Ireland (Campus Oil), EU:C:1984:256, para 21.
44. Case C-39/90, Denkavit Futtermittel GmbH v. Land Baden-Württemberg,
EU:C:1991:267, para 19.
45. Recital 2 ICT. See also Case 7/68,Commission v. Italy (Arts Treasures), EU:C:1968:51,
429.
46. Consultation Paper, supra note 33, at 3 and Directive proposal COM(2007)765 final,
at 19.
47. Recitals 2 and 5 ICT.
48. Recitals 5, 13 and Art. 1(3) ICT.
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challenged the compatibility of national licensing measures with EU law on
this basis. So far, EU case law has only indicated that licensing measures
applicable to the import, export and transit of dual-use goods could be
justified on grounds of public security.49 Secondly, the fact that, unusually, the
ICT seeks to harmonize national measures justified not only under Article 36
TFEU within the scope of the Treaty but also under Article 346 TFEU outside
the Treaty altogether, raises questions as to the form and level of judicial
scrutiny that will be applied by the EU courts to national licensing measures
taken under Article 346 TFEU. Prior to the ICT, Member States considered
that measures concerning armaments, including licensing in relation to
transfers, were automatically and categorically excluded from the TFEU
under Article 346 TFEU50 on the basis that such measures affect Member
States’ essential security interests.51 The justifiability of those measures under
Article 36 TFEU does not appear to have been fully addressed. In the related
field of defence procurement, the ECJ continues to refine its general
interpretation that Article 346 TFEU does not represent an automatic or
categorical exclusion of trade in defence products from the otherwise
applicable TFEU.52 Like the free movement exceptions, such as Article 36
49. Case C-367/89, Criminal Proceedings against Aimé Richardt and Les Accessoires
Scientifiques SNC, EU:C:1991:376; Case C-70/94, Fritz Werner Industrie-Ausrüstungen
GmbH v. Germany, EU:C:1995:328, and Case C-83/94, Criminal Proceedings against Peter
Leifer, EU:C:1995:329.
50. Whilst difficult to empirically validate, this assessment was made in UNISYS report,
supra note 6, at 70–72 and the Impact Assessment, supra note 6, at 19.
51. Art. 346(1)(b) TFEU: “… any Member State may take such measures as it considers
necessary for the protection of the essential interests of its security which are connected with
the production of or trade in arms, munitions and war material; such measures shall not
adversely affect the conditions of competition in the internal market regarding products which
are not intended for specifically military purposes…” In 1958, the Council compiled a list of
armaments to which Art. 346(1)(b) TFEU applies. See Council Decision 298/58 of 15 Apr.
1958 (not published). On Art. 346 TFEU, see Trybus, op. cit. supra note 2, pp. 87–128;
Koutrakos, “The Application of EC law to defence industries: Changing interpretations of
Article 296 EC” in Barnard and Odudu (Eds.), The Outer Limits of European Union Law (Hart,
2009), pp. 307–328 and Pourbaix, “The future scope of application of Article 346 TFEU”, 20
Public Procurement Law Review (2011), 1–8.
52. Case C-414/97, Commission v. Spain, EU:C:1999:417. This interpretation was
reiterated in Commission, Interpretative Communication on the Application of Article 296 of
the Treaty in the field of defence procurement COM(2006)779 final. This position has been
confirmed and further refined in subsequent judgments: theAgusta judgments (Case C-337/05,
Commission v. Italy, EU:C:2008:203 and Case C-157/06, Commission v. Italy,
EU:C:2008:530); the Military Exports judgments (Case C-284/05, Commission v. Finland,
EU:C:2009:778; Case C-294/05, Commission v. Sweden, EU:C:2009:779; Case C-387/05,
Commission v. Italy, EU:C:2009:781; Case C-409/05,Commission v.Greece, EU:C:2009:782;
Case C-461/05, Commission v. Denmark, EU:C:2009:783; Case C-38/06, Commission v.
Portugal, EU:C:2010:108; Case C-239/06, Commission v. Italy, EU:C:2009:784) and Finnish
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TFEU,Article 346 TFEU must be interpreted narrowly.53 Member States must
specifically invoke Article 346 TFEU and prove that a situation justifying its
use exists. In the Commission’s view, it is not possible to infer from
Article 346 TFEU a general proviso inherent in the TFEU covering all
measures taken by Member States, and it has no effect on its legislative power
to adopt harmonizing legislation concerning defence product transfers.54
Notwithstanding, this leaves unresolved the issue of the extent of deference to
be shown by the EU courts to national licensing measures which are prima
facie incompatible with the ICT in light of this politically sensitive context.
Whilst it is beyond the scope of this article to address these questions of EU
constitutional law, they further expose longstanding uncertainty regarding the
proper relationship between Article 36 and 346 TFEU.
In any event, it is questionable whether the legal basis for harmonization or
the compatibility of the ICT with the TFEU would be challenged. Member
States have not signalled any indication that the ICT is an encroachment on
their competences. Further, the choice of a directive is consistent with EU
legal approaches to licensing and transfers in related areas e.g. firearms and
explosives for civil use.55 The ICT also mirrors calls for action to regulate
transfers of dual-use goods i.e. goods for military and civil purposes. An EU
dual-use regulation establishes a common set of EU rules for the export of
dual-use goods, but it has been criticized because it continues to enable
Member States to impose restrictive controls on intra-EU transfers of dual-use
goods; the ICT is identified as a potential model on which to base future
harmonization.56 On balance, it is better to have a directive that uses EU
measures to reduce the effect of lawful restrictions than leave restrictive
national measures in place unharmonized. Member States no longer need to
Turntables (Case C-615/10, Insinööritoimisto InsTiimi Oy, EU:C:2012:324), and most recently
Case C-246/12 P, Ellinika Nafpigeia, EU:C:2013:133, and Case C-474/12, Schiebel Aircraft,
EU:C:2014:2139.
53. Case 222/84, Johnston, EU:C:1986:206, para 26. See also Case 13/68, Salgoil,
EU:C:1968:54, at 463, and Case 7/68, Commission v. Italy, supra note 42, at 644.
54. Impact Assessment, supra note 6, at 19–20, citing Opinion of A.G. La Pergola in Case
C-273/97, Sirdar, EU:C:1999:246.
55. Council Directive 91/477/EEC on control of the acquisition and possession of weapons
O.J. 1991, L 256/51 and Council Directive 93/15/EEC on the harmonization of the provisions
relating to the placing on the market and supervision of explosives for civil uses O.J. 1993, L
121/20. The ICT is without prejudice to these Directives, see Recital 15 ICT.
56. Council Regulation (EC) 428/2009 of 5 May 2009 setting up a Community regime for
the control of exports, transfer, brokering and transit of dual-use items, O.J. 2009, L 134//1.This
Regulation requires controls on the transfer of certain items listed in Annex IV: Arts. 2(11) and
22. See COM(2011)393 final, at 18–19.
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introduce or maintain other restrictions unless exceptionally required by
Articles 36 or 346 TFEU.57
2.2.2. Nature and scope of harmonization
The key purported objective of harmonization is to simplify intra-Union
transfers.58 However, it is questionable to what extent the ICT achieves
substantive minimum harmonization. Simplification may address the
complexity of national licensing measures by standardizing the types of
permissible licence. However, this does not address other equally, if not more,
restrictive trade barriers, a prime example being restrictive licensing
conditions, the national diversity of which was criticized above. This issue is
compounded by the fact that the ICT does not fully address the underlying
causes of complexity and diversity. Short of the EU adopting EU-wide
comprehensive policies to coordinate both the transfer and export of defence
products, the ICT’s default position is largely to accommodate rather than
systematically address these concerns through its provisions. An important
limitation of the ICT’s scope is that harmonization of transfer rules and
procedures is said to be without prejudice to Member States’ policies
regarding transfers,59 international obligations or commitments,60 and
policies on the export of defence-related products.61 Consequently, as is
discussed below (section 4), Member States retain considerable discretion to
determine the terms, conditions and products applicable for each type of
licence including third country export limitations; the latter remains a key
organizing construct of the ICT, conditioning its application.62 Therefore, the
simplification to be achieved through standardized licensing is undermined
by the continuing diversity of national approaches to these key issues. A
revised ICT should identify more clearly its harmonization objectives and
their scope.
The ICT is also equivocal with regard to its scope of coverage concerning
“intergovernmental cooperation” broadly construed but undefined in the ICT.
57. Recital 13 ICT.
58. Recitals 6 and 43 and Art. 1 ICT. See Recital 3 ICT referring to the more general
objectives of removing disparities which may distort competition and hamper innovation,
industrial cooperation and competitiveness.
59. Recital 6 ICT.
60. Recital 7 ICT.
61. Ibid., and Art. 1(2) ICT. See also Recital 30 ICT referring to Member State cooperation
within the framework of Council Common Position 2008/944/CFSP of 8 Dec. 2008 defining
common rules governing control of exports of military technology and equipment O.J. 2008, L
335/99. See also SWD(2016)398 final/2, at 24.
62. The number of references to exports in the Recitals alone is indicative. See Recitals 4,
7, 12, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 33, 34, 35 and 36 ICT. See also GRIP study, supra note 7, at 60.
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The ICT permits rather than requires publication of a general licence for the
purposes of participation in an “intergovernmental cooperation
programme”.63 However, Member States may exempt from licensing transfers
necessary for the implementation of a “cooperative armament programme
between Member States”.64 Further, a Member State or the Commission at
their own initiative may seek to amend the ICT to also exempt a transfer
necessary for “intergovernmental cooperation” as referred to in Article 1(4).65
Article 1(4) provides that the ICT does not affect the possibility for Member
States to pursue and further develop intergovernmental cooperation, whilst
complying with the ICT.66
Therefore, on the one hand, the LoI identified above (section 2.1) could
continue to provide an independent framework for more detailed licensing
measures, thereby potentially influencing the future development of the ICT
regime.67 On the other hand, the co-existence of intergovernmental and
supranational licensing regimes in a “two-speed” Europe may not be
sustainable. The LoI acquis has already been largely transferred to the EU in
light of the EU’s exercise of competences in the field of defence trade.68
Further, certain Member States may argue that licensing measures adopted
under frameworks outside the ICT to which they are not party may be
discriminatory, a risk identified as a particular reason for introducing the
ICT.69 A revised ICT should clarify its coverage regarding intergovernmental
cooperation.
3. General coverage
The ICT applies to defence-related products (Arts. 2 and 3(1)). These are
set out in an Annex which must correspond to the EU Common Military
List (“CML”)70 adopted in the context of Council Common Position
63. Art. 5(3) ICT. “Intergovernmental cooperation programme” is not defined. See also
section 4.3.1. infra.
64. Art. 4(2)(c) ICT. Similarly, “Cooperative armament programme” is not defined. See
section 4.3.3. infra.
65. See Recital 16 ICT and Art. 4(3)(c) ICT.
66. See also Recital 8 ICT. “Intergovernmental cooperation” is not defined.
67. The authors are grateful to officials in the UK Dept. of Business, Innovation, and Skills
for discussions on the LoI’s continuing lead role.
68. The relevant Sub-Committee recognizes the EU’s competence to regulate intra-Union
transfers.
69. Impact Assessment, supra note 6, Table of Comparison of Options at 44.
70. Common Military List of the European Union, O.J. 2007, L 88/58. See also Recital 10
ICT.
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2008/944/CFSP for defence exports.71 Article 13(1) ICT requires the
Commission to update the Annex to strictly correspond to the CML, which
has, to date, already been amended three times.72 This is intended to address
the criticism of the variable use of national lists (discussed above). However,
the ICT’s harmonization-through-simplification objective has thus already
been compromised. Whilst the Annex should be identical to the CML at all
times, for most of the year it has not fully corresponded, because the procedure
for amending and transposing the Annex has taken at least seven months.73
The Commission therefore rightly considers it necessary to simplify the
procedure for aligning the Annex and CML,74 but is yet to “examine options
to simplify and speed up annual updates”.75
The 2016 Evaluation Report makes no concrete proposal for an
amendment; rather it contemplates a “limited revision of the Directive, e.g. by
separating the Annex from the Directive and by annual adoption of the
updates by Commission decision”. 76 This is the only aspect of the ICT for
which the Commission discusses a “hard law” amendment in the short term as
opposed to the revision of certain of the ICT’s other provisions in the “longer
run”.77 However, the Evaluation Report appears obscure and opaque on this
issue.78 It could be assumed that the Commission is suggesting that the Annex
should be separated from the Directive as a stand-alone document to be
periodically amended by a Commission Decision. Yet, it is not entirely clear
how this will reduce delay and improve coherence.
Moreover, the two Commission Recommendations published with the 2016
Evaluation Report are relevant here. As is discussed below, contracting
authorities have excluded certain products from falling within the scope of
general transfer licences, thereby limiting their harmonizing potential. By
contrast, the Recommendations contain “a minimum set of less sensitive
defence related products and components” to be covered by general transfer
71. The CML is updated by the Council annually, usually as a consequence of an
amendment to the Munitions List adopted in the framework of the Wassenaar Arrangement.
The latest version is the Wassenaar Arrangement on Export Controls for Conventional Arms
and Dual-Use Goods and Technologies, List of Dual-Use Goods and Technologies and
Munitions List, WA-LIST (14) 2* 25 Mar. 2015.
72. Recitals 37 and 45 and Art. 13(1) ICT. See Commission Directive 2010/80/EU, O.J.
2010, L 308/11; Directive 2012/10/EU, O.J. 2012, L 85/3; Directive 2014/108/EU, O.J. 2014, L
359/117.
73. Transposition Report, supra note 7, at 13.
74. Ibid. See also 2016 Evaluation Report, supra note 5, at 9; GRIP study, supra note 7, at
64 and Technopolis report, supra note 4 at Appendix G, at 107.
75. COM(2016)760 final, at 12.
76. Ibid.
77. Ibid., on revision in the “longer run” regarding exemptions, for example.
78. No further detail is provided by SWD(2016) 398 final/2, at 38–40.
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licences79 issued for certified recipients80 and for armed forces and certain
contracting authorities.81 This “minimum set” is a “subset” of the list of
products laid down in the ICT’s Annex. The Recommendations also exclude
certain Military List (ML) categories completely from falling within the
minimum set,82 include others for most goods but with exceptions, or only
include a few goods of some other ML categories. Therefore, Member States
and the Commission have carefully decided, item-by-item on the CML, if the
item can be included in the subset.83
However, it is doubtful whether this reduces the coverage problems
outlined above. This is because the “subset” of defence goods, while
comprising more than half of the list in the Annex, is not necessarily immune
from the problems regarding updating and aligning the Annex and CML
outlined above. At best, the Recommendations partly address the issue of
which types of product should typically be subject to a general transfer licence
for the armed forces and certified recipient categories, as a minimum (see
below, section 4.3.2). The categories within the sub-set would still have to be
updated, presumably by the proposed Commission Decisions. Thus, the
Commission assumes that by identifying a subset of defence goods for general
licences in just two select circumstances, this soft-law approach will expedite
the uptake and use of general licences and remove barriers to trade more
quickly than “hard law” harmonization. The latter would involve an
amendment to the ICT, which is considered but not (yet) proposed in the 2016
Evaluation Report.
Arguably, the Commission’s approach is highly problematic.
Fundamentally, it raises underlying constitutional questions about the
propriety of using CFSP-like mechanisms in the context of internal transfers,
empowering Member States but excluding the European Parliament84 and
ultimately the CJEU85 in an area with Internal Market competence. Further, it
relies on the good faith of Member States or peer pressure to adhere to the
Recommendation. The crucial issues of coverage by reference to the Annex
and CML should be addressed in a clear and certain manner, principally
through a “hard law” amendment of the ICT itself and not exclusively through
79. COM(2016)760 final, at 11.
80. C(2016)7728 final, at 3. See sections 4.3.1. and 6. infra.
81. C(2016)7711 final, at 3. See section 4.3.1 infra.
82. E.g. ML2 large smooth-bore weapons, ML3 ammunition, or ML8 energetic material.
83. See Recitals 5 of both Commission Recommendations C(2016)7728 final and
C(2016)7711 final.
84. An amendment of the ICT would involve the Parliament through the ordinary
legislative procedure.
85. A Recommendation is not legally binding and can therefore not be challenged in an
action for annulment.
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confusing “soft-law” Recommendations. As is argued below, a “hard law”
amendment should similarly clarify the circumstances in which general
licences must be used, according to minimum prescribed categories of
product.
4. Transfers and licences
The fundamental innovation intended by the ICT is to qualitatively
differentiate transfers from exports. Article 3(2) defines a “transfer” as “any
transmission or movement of a defence-related product from a supplier to a
recipient in another Member State”.86 The transfer of defence products from
one Member State to another must be subject to prior authorization in the form
of a licence. However, a further licence cannot be imposed for mere passage87
of those products through one or more other Member States or for entrance
onto Member State territory, unless justified on public security or public
policy grounds. 88 Further to this aim, the ICT seeks to facilitate the
progressive replacement of individual ex ante control, exercised through
narrowly defined licences, with more broadly defined licences compensated
by ex post controls, including conditions on export after licensed transfers.89 It
is therefore important to acknowledge that the ICT does not create a European
“licence-free zone” of free movement comparable to most other goods. A
transfer licence is still a form of prior authorization, but one which is to be
distinguished from an export licence.90 Two principal reasons have been
identified for retaining a licensing regime. The first concerns the relative
infancy of a common foreign policy and “uneven levels of trust” about the
86. Arts. 3(3) and 3(4) ICT which define “supplier” and “recipient”, respectively.
87. Recitals 9, 17 and Art. 4(1) ICT. Art. 3(7) ICT defines “passage through” as “the
transport of defence-related products through one or more Member States other than the
originating and receiving Member States.”
88. Recital 14 ICT identifies the safety of storage, risk of diversion and prevention of crime
as legitimate reasons. Germany, Hungary and the Netherlands have made use of these
exceptions to maintain entrance and passage licences or prior notification systems for certain
product categories. See Transposition Report, supra note 7, at 18. According to EP report “The
impact…”, cited supra note 7, at 43 fn 72, this is a limitation to the ICT’s application; in
practice, companies will have to inquire as to the existence of such measures. The Technopolis
report, supra note 4, Appendix K, at 171 states that such measures are permissible on public
security or transport safety grounds, but acknowledges that their compatibility with EU law has
not been comprehensively tested and even considers a potential need for legislation to address
transit licences.
89. Recital 29 ICT.
90. Art. 3(5) ICT which defines a “transfer licence”. See also Recital 16 ICT. Art. 3(6) ICT
defines an “export licence”.
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extent to which certain external borders maintain sufficient control.91 The
second is that the removal of licensing altogether would complicate
enforcement of export controls that are otherwise required by existing
international export control regimes.92 Ultimately, licensing was still
considered necessary as a “vehicle” to carry possible re-export limitations.93
4.1. Types of transfer licence
Prior to the ICT, individual, general, and global licences were available. All
three have been retained under the ICT and transposed into national laws.94
Member States remain free to determine the appropriate choice of licence and
the types of products covered.95 An individual transfer licence must be
specifically requested by a supplier. It grants one specific authorization for a
single transfer of a specified quantity of specified products to be transmitted
in one or several shipments to only one recipient (Art. 7 ICT). A general
transfer licence is an authorization granted to suppliers established in one
Member State to perform transfers of specified defence-related products to
categories of recipients located in another Member State. The main
distinguishing feature is that a Member State is obliged to publish a general
licence, so that a supplier meeting its terms and conditions is directly
authorized to transfer without having to specifically request to do so in each
case (Art. 5 (1) and Recital 21 ICT). Abolition of such requests enables a freer
movement of specified goods and increased security of supply. Between the
extremes of an individual and a general licence there is the global transfer
licence. A global licence must be specifically requested by a supplier. It grants
a specific authorization to transfer products to authorized recipients in one or
more other Member States (Art. 6(1) ICT). The significant point of departure
for the ICT is an attempt to change the type of licence predominantly used in
practice, away from restrictive individual licences towards broader general
licences, and to exempt certain transfers from licensing altogether.
4.2. Individual transfer licences
Formerly, individual transfer licences were the most common licence,
contributing significantly to the costs and barriers to trade discussed in section
91. Impact Assessment, supra note 6, at 24.
92. Ibid., identifying Wassenaar and the Missile Technology Control Regime. See also
Recitals 7 and 28 ICT.
93. Impact Assessment, supra note 6, at 24–25.
94. Ibid., at 4. See also Art. 4(4) ICT and Transposition Report, supra note 7, at 8.
95. Art. 4(5) and Recital 18 ICT.
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2.1 above.96 Notwithstanding their continued availability, the ICT aims to
reduce recourse to individual licences to four exhaustively defined
circumstances discussed below. However, beyond prescribing these
circumstances, the ICT contains no further provisions regarding the permitted
terms and conditions and period of validity.97
The first circumstance in which individual licences may still be used is
where the request is limited to one transfer. This is unlikely to be particularly
problematic given that the licence is not imposed by the licensing authority in
order to limit the user’s ability to transfer, but rather a single transfer is
expressly requested by the user. The second is where an individual licence is
necessary for compliance with international obligations and commitments.
This reflects the ICT’s general approach to ensuring compliance with other
international obligations and commitments.98 Reliance on this circumstance is
nevertheless likely to be subject to implied limitations to ensure that those
international agreements or arrangements genuinely require an individual
licence and are not used to circumvent the Directive. The third is where an
individual licence is necessary for the protection of essential security interests
or on grounds of public policy.99 As indicated above (section 2.2.1), this may
be an attempt to accommodate such interests inside the regime rather than
through a TFEU exception or derogation. However, to avoid this circumstance
developing into a loophole, in line with the case law on these TFEU
derogations outlined above, the use of an individual licence should be subject
to proportionality requirements and judicial review. There is a danger that,
when challenged, Member States could retrospectively justify using an
individual licence under this circumstance. Therefore, there is a clear need for
the reasons to grant an individual licence to be documented and reviewed by a
senior licensing officer; the ICT should be amended to include such a
requirement.
The final circumstance is where a Member State has “serious reason” to
believe that the supplier will not be able to comply with all the terms and
conditions necessary to grant it a global transfer licence. Whilst this reinforces
the ICT’s attempt to institute a hierarchy or preference of licences (i.e. general
or global in preference to individual), Member States exercise discretion to
96. Impact Assessment, supra note 6, at 36.
97. According to UNISYS report, supra note 6, at 14, prior to the ICT, individual licences
typically expired after 12 months or on fulfilment of a specified quantity. In the UK, individual
licences under the ICT are considered equivalent to Standard Individual Export Licence
(SIELs) and are valid for 2 years, see the Department for Business Innovation & Skills, Notice
to Exporters 2012/37 Implementation of the European Union Directive 2009/43/EC
(Intra-Community Transfer of Defence Goods or ICT Directive), at 3.
98. Recital 7 ICT.
99. See also Recital 14 ICT.
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determine the terms and conditions (and products) for each type of licence. It
is therefore difficult to know which terms and conditions are more or less
susceptible to non-compliance, thus legitimating use of an individual licence.
This is symptomatic more generally of the fact that the ICT does not provide
clear guidance to Member States in differentiating when a particular type of
licence should be used or regarding the terms and conditions applicable to
each type. Secondly, it is not clear what will constitute a “serious reason”. It is
argued that a revised ICT should retain a circumstance in which an authority
grants an individual licence on its own initiative (as opposed to at the
supplier’s request) and for reasons other than to protect essential security, as
some default authorization is necessary e.g. if it is not possible to comply with
an alternative licence and for truly sensitive products.100 However, clarity is
required as to the reasons that might justify an individual licence as well as the
burden of proof. This is necessary to safeguard against the risk of abuse which
could prejudice a successful transition to general licences as the norm.
Ultimately, there are few indications that recourse to individual licences is
decreasing. According to the 2016 Evaluation Report individual licences
continue to be used for 80–90 per cent of transfers.101 Starkly, the Report
contains scarce reference to individual licences. Unlike the Recommendations
and proposals for soft law guidance regarding general licences, the Evaluation
Report simply states that competent authorities should “encourage operators
to use [general licences] instead of [individual licences] where circumstances
allow.”102
4.3. General transfer licences
As indicated, Member States are free to determine the appropriate licence
(Art. 4(5) ICT). However, the ICT signals a clear emphasis on general transfer
licences as the least restrictive form.103 Prior to the ICT, Member States, with
the exception of the UK, did not provide for extensive use of general
licences.104 The Commission had even considered a regime exclusively
comprising general licences. Whilst this could have minimized bureaucracy
100. The authors are grateful to Baudouin Heuninckx for discussions on this issue.
101. Supra note 5, at 5. See also Technopolis report, supra note 4, at 2. This constitutes
approximately 20,000–25,000 per year, see Appendix G, 112–113, Table 48.
102. COM(2016)760 final, at 12. SWD(2016)398 final/2 does not address individual
licences.
103. GRIP study, supra note 7, at 42: “the licence of reference.”
104. Impact Assessment, supra note 6, at 15, 34. The UK has widely implemented a general
licence for military goods under Open General Export Licences (OGELs). See Masson et al.,
op. cit. supra note 3, at 15–19. This has enabled an effective transposition of the ICT in the UK
with relatively few adjustments. See also Notice to Exporters 2012/37 supra note 97 referring
at 2 to the ICT model being “UK inspired”.
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and significantly improved security of supply, the Commission considered it
to be unacceptable not least because the general licence is not suitable for the
most sensitive equipment.105
4.3.1. Circumstances requiring general licences
The ICT provides a list of “at least” four circumstances in which publication
of a general licence is mandatory (Art. 5(2)(a)-(d)). Therefore, Member States
may exceed the minimum by requiring general licences in additional
circumstances not listed.106
Perhaps the most significant circumstance requiring a general licence is
where the recipient is certified in accordance with the ICT’s certification
provisions. The combined ability of a supplier to rely on a general licence
compensated by certification of the recipient is a key component of the ICT.107
As outlined above, one of the two November 2016 Commission
Recommendations provides that Member States will issue general licences for
certified recipients covering, “as a minimum”, the sub-set of products listed in
the ICT Annex.108 This is intended to result in quicker issuance of general
licences with regard to those products. Additionally, the Recommendation
provides for a non-exhaustive list of conditions to be incorporated into the
general licence for certified recipients, concerning geographic validity,
re-transfers within the EEA, subsequent sales not known at the time of
transfer, and ex post verification.109
A second circumstance is where the recipient is part of a Member State’s
armed forces or a defence contracting authority, purchasing for the exclusive
use by that Member State’s armed forces. This circumstance is intended to
have a specific impact on defence procurement. For instance, Article 23(a)
Defence and Security Procurement Directive 2009/81/EC provides that, in
order to ensure security of supply, a contracting authority can require a
tenderer to demonstrate that it will be able to honour its obligations regarding
the export, transfer and transit of goods associated with the contract. It is
usually the case that at the time of tender preparation, the authorization to
transfer equipment will not yet have been granted. Therefore, in some cases,
contracting authorities may consider that a foreign supplier poses a greater
risk with regard to guaranteeing security of supply than a domestic supplier
105. Impact Assessment, ibid., at 34–35.
106. On minimum harmonization, Weatherill, “Beyond preemption? Shared competence
and constitutional change in the European Community” in O’Keeffe and Twomey (Eds.) Legal
Issues of the Maastricht Treaty (Chancery Law Publishing, 1994); Dougan, “Minimum
Harmonization and the Internal Market”, 37 CML Rev. (2000), 853.
107. Art. 9 ICT concerns the certification of recipients of defence-related products. See
also Recital 23 ICT. See section 6 infra.
108. C(2016)7728 final, at 3 with the sub-set list at 3–4.
109. C(2016)7728 final, at 5–6.
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given the difficulty of having to obtain a licence. The Commission’s Guidance
Note on Security of Supply, published to assist transposition of Directive
2009/81/EC, suggests that this uncertainty is now removed given that a
general licence will have already been published with the necessary
authorization.110 Recital 22 ICT also indicates that this will “greatly increase”
security of supply to armed forces.
However, general licences can still be withdrawn or granted with end-use
restrictions and much still depends on the type of products covered, all of
which may continue to hinder security of supply.111 More fundamentally, it
may be questioned to what extent security of supply can be guaranteed
whatever licence is used, not least because such guarantees only represent the
tenderer’s position at the time of tender.112 Rather, the best assurance of
optimal security of supply is to eliminate any licensing requirement altogether.
This is currently only possible if a Member State decides to exempt armed
forces transfers from prior authorization. There is an argument for
presumptively exempting armed forces transfers from prior authorization (see
below). According to the latest report, the armed forces circumstance
currently represents 21 per cent of applications for registration to use an ICT
general licence.113
Similar to the 2016 Commission Recommendation on general licences for
certified recipients, another Recommendation provides that Member States
will issue general licences for armed forces and relevant contracting
authorities covering, “as a minimum”, the sub-set of products listed in the ICT
Annex as well as a non-exhaustive list of conditions to be incorporated
concerning geographic validity, re-transfers within the EEA, subsequent sales
not known at the time of transfer, and ex post verification.114 The approach in
the Recommendation must be contrasted with the fact that the ICT also
currently provides that Member States may actually exempt transfers from all
licence requirements where the recipient is part of the armed forces (see
further section 4.3.3. below). It is clear that these options suggest that transfers
under this constellation present lower security risks in general. This
combination of coverage and optional exemption raises questions as to
110. DG Internal Market and Services, Guidance Note, “Security of Supply”, at 10. There
is no comparable Guidance Note for the implementation of the ICT – though the issuance of
such guidance is rare.
111. This view has also been expressed by the UK in its guidance published to assist
interpretation of the UK Regulations implementing Directive 2009/81/EC. See The Defence
and Security Public Contract Regulations 2011, Chapter 12 – Security of Supply, at 7, para 38.
See further section 5 infra.
112. Heuninckx, op. cit. supra note 2, at 24.
113. Technopolis report, supra note 4, Appendix G, at 114. See also SWD(2016)398
final/2, at 18.
114. C(2016)7711, at 5–6.
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whether transfers for armed forces should be subject to licensing at all.
Ultimately, both the fact that only a few Member States have provided for full
exemption and the Commission’s Recommendation suggest a continued
desire to have a general licence for armed forces albeit with a commitment to
greater convergence in products covered and the possibility of exemption from
licensing. However, it is argued that the Recommendation is insufficient to
achieve minimum harmonization for armed forces transfers. As indicated, the
possibility of exemption already signals that this field is more a candidate for
total liberalization than optional harmonization through a Recommendation.
Therefore, if general licences do remain strictly necessary for such transfers,
at the very least, the ICT should be revised to make it a legal requirement
that general licences for armed forces transfers must be subject to minimum
prescribed product categories covered, prescribed categories excluded
and minimum conditions. Indeed, the 2016 Evaluation Report itself considers
the “possibility of converting the [Recommendations] on [general transfer
licences] into binding provisions”.115 Whilst the Commission’s tentative
approach is understandable given the continuing diversity of Member
State practices post-ICT, it is difficult to see how a non-legally binding
Recommendation will significantly improve compliance. It also seems
impractical for the Commission to issue non-legally binding
Recommendations every time it wishes to test whether or not an area could be
amenable to further harmonization through legal reform at some
indeterminate point in the future. It is also not conducive to legal certainty.
The third and fourth circumstances are where the transfer is made for the
purposes of demonstration, evaluation or exhibition or for the purposes of
maintenance and repair.116 The latest report indicates that these represent 71
per cent of applications to use general licences and are therefore the most
common.117 Again, it is arguable that such transfers could be presumptively
exempted from licensing altogether (see below). However, the high uptake of
general licences for this circumstance suggests that retention of a general
licence is the preferred approach. It might also explain why no Commission
Recommendation was issued for this circumstance. However, the 2016
Evaluation Report suggests that a further Recommendation for this
circumstance is considered.118
In addition, Member States participating in an intergovernmental
cooperation programme may publish a general licence for transfers necessary
115. COM(2016)760 final, at 13.
116. In the case of maintenance and repair, the recipient must be the originating supplier of
the defence-related products: Art. 5(2)(d) ICT.
117. Technopolis report, supra note 4, Appendix G, 114: “demonstration, evaluation or
exhibition” (41%) and “repair or maintenance” (31%). See also SWD(2016)398 final/2, at 18.
118. COM(2016)760 final, at 11 (bullet point 3).
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for the programme’s execution.119 Few large armaments-producing Member
States have transposed this option.120 Arguably, such transfers could be the
subject of presumptive exemption from licensing altogether, although this
matter is complicated by general uncertainty about the extent to which the ICT
should include or exclude intergovernmental cooperation within its coverage.
Overall, the potential variability of national transposition resulting from
minimum harmonization is already apparent. According to the latest report, at
least three Member States do not offer any general licences, four do not offer
all four mandatory licences, whilst at least ten others go beyond the mandatory
circumstances e.g. by providing for the optional cooperative armament
programme general licences or for transfers to the police, customs and border
and coast guards.121 The ICT also seems to suggest that further general
licences could be published where the risks to security are low in view of the
nature of the product and recipients.122 The 2016 Evaluation Report considers
creating new circumstances, “e.g. for product return after exhibition or repair,
for cross-border cooperation in research, [or] for all purpose transfers (e.g.
covering purchase, maintenance, supply of spare parts).”123 However, this is
not a proposed amendment and only considered “in the long run”.124
Conversely, as suggested below, the ICT’s primary focus should be on
subjecting the highest risk transfers to licensing whilst exempting low risk
transfers from licensing altogether, rather than establishing minimum
licensing requirements whatever the risk (see section 4.3.3.).
4.3.2. Coverage of general licences
As explained above, Member States determine not only the choice of licence
but also the types of products listed in the Annex corresponding to the CML
covered by the licence.125 Several issues have arisen in this regard. First,
119. Recital 24 and Art. 5(3) ICT. An example might include the Eurofighter/Typhoon
fighter. See generally Heuninckx, The Law of Collaborative Defence Procurement in the
European Union (Cambridge University Press, 2016), Ch. 8.
120. Art. 5(3) ICT. According to the Transposition Report, supra note 7, at 9, Spain
envisages general licences for transfers related to operations of NATO and NAMSA; Bulgaria,
Greece, Cyprus, and Malta envisage general licences for cooperation programmes. See also EP
report “The impact…”, cited supra note 7, at 46, fn 82. This means that large
armaments-producing Member States have not transposed this option. The authors are grateful
to Baudouin Heuninckx for this observation.
121. Technopolis report, supra note 4, at 33, Table 14. Bulgaria, Iceland and Ireland do not
currently offer any general licences; France, Italy, Romania and Slovenia do not provide all of
the mandatory licences. See also Appendix G, 111. See also SWD(2016)398 final/2, at 16–17.
122. Recital 25 ICT.
123. COM(2016)760 final, at 12–13.
124. Ibid., at 12.
125. Recital 18 and Art. 4(5) ICT. Specifically concerning general licences, see Art. 5(1)
ICT.
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practice already indicates that, whilst all Member States refer to the CML,
there is continuing use of national and international lists when determining
the coverage of licences.126 This variability is exacerbated by the fact that the
Annex does not always correspond to the CML.127
Second, it is questionable whether the ICT provides an effective balance
between Member States’ freedom to limit the types of products that can be
subject to a general licence and ensuring that general licences can be used for
as broad a range of products as possible. On the one hand, Member States
appear to define the scope of their general licences case-by-case based on
factors such as the recipient in question, the sensitivity of the product, risk
assessment and diversion risk on export.128 This is a perfectly legitimate
exercise, allowing authorities to tailor a licence to a particular security
scenario.129 On the other hand, post-transposition practice suggests that there
is a lack of consensus as to how to define or classify “sensitive”130 products
that should be excluded from the scope of a general licence.131 Given the need
to encourage the uptake of general licences, it is understandable that the ICT
provides maximum flexibility to select from the full range of listed products.
Further, it is preferable for authorities to assess the sensitivity of products to be
covered by a general licence, as opposed to using the sensitivity of products as
a basis to simply legitimate recourse to individual licences, as has previously
been the case. However, as discussed in section 3, the 2016 Recommendations
clearly indicate the possibility to distinguish less sensitive products that
should typically be subject to general licences from those which should or
may not.132 It was argued that an amendment to the ICT should formalize
mandatory product categories typically covered by general licences and those
prima facie excluded.133 The ICT should also include an amendment that
requires that any licence conditions must reflect a genuine and proportionate
control need to avoid possible attempts to circumvent the ICT. Member States
126. GRIP study, supra note 7, at 23–27, 28-9, and 38-9.
127. Ibid., at 25. Luxembourg appears to be the only country referring to the most recent
version of the ICT Annex in the definition of defence goods covered by its general transfer
licences.
128. Ibid., at 23.
129. The authors are grateful to Baudouin Heuninckx for this observation.
130. This must be contrasted with Art. 4(8) ICT which indicates that the sensitivity of a
transfer of components is relevant to determining the application of any export limitations for
components. See Art. 4(8) ICT.
131. GRIP study, supra note 7, at 38.
132. Art. 4(7) ICT already requires Member States to assess the sensitivity of the transfer
when determining the terms and conditions of licences for components, taking into account
their nature and significance.
133. An obvious example might be category ML17g nuclear power generating equipment.
The authors are grateful to Baudouin Heuninckx for his observations.
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might argue that this impinges on the exercise of their transfer policies, but it
has been observed that national practice at present “varies greatly…and
patterns are difficult to establish”.134 Lack of “visibility and clarity” of
different national lists135 and conditions has ultimately made general licences
less attractive for companies.136
It has been suggested that the ICT should ideally include a harmonized list
of covered products using the CML as an already widely used reference point
with clearer correspondence to international control lists.137 A harmonized
list would be comprehensive, based on a common understanding of “sensitive
products” to be definitively included or excluded from the list. However, it
appears impossible at this stage to recommend a detailed list of sensitive
products to be excluded that would be accepted by all Member States.138 It has
therefore been recommended that a positive or minimum list should be
adopted.139 Determining “sensitivity” of products based on product coverage
rather than Member State discretion may reduce subjectivity. Several Member
States and companies have called for such a list “while taking into account
national limitations” which would presumably need to be clearly defined.140
However, some flexibility needs to be retained to encourage the use of general
licences. The 2016 Commission Recommendations on general licences for
armed forces and certified companies,141 address these issues to some extent,
but only in relation to the subset of defence goods they contain.
4.3.3. Exemptions
It is recalled that the ICT lists four circumstances in which general licences are
required. However, the ICT also identifies five circumstances in which
Member States may optionally exempt transfers from prior authorization
altogether. 142 It is suggested that the similarity between certain circumstances
requiring or permitting general licences and certain circumstances permitting
exemption from licensing altogether, indicate uncertainty as to the level at
which to set the floor of harmonization. On the one hand, it could be argued
that the exemptions merely offer Member States the option of going beyond
134. GRIP study, supra note 7, at 27.
135. Ibid., at 27.According to the Transposition Report, supra note 5, at 9, only six Member
States had communicated their respective lists to the Commission.
136. GRIP study, supra note 7, at 39.
137. Ibid., at 63 emphasizes the design of the list based specifically on the Wassenaar List.
138. Ibid., at 39.
139. Ibid., at 63.
140. Ibid., at 48 and 63.
141. C(2016)7711 final; C(2016)7728 final, discussed in sections 4.3.1 supra and 6. infra.
142. Art. 4(3) ICT further provides for the Commission on its own initiative or at a Member
State’s request to amend the ICT to exempt three additional circumstances from prior
authorization.
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harmonization to achieve total licence-free liberalization. On the other hand, it
also raises legitimate questions as to whether certain circumstances requiring
or permitting the use of general licences should be subject to prior
authorization through a licence at all.
Two of the circumstances allowing optional exemption from prior
authorization appear to be the least controversial in achieving total
liberalization: first, where the EU, NATO, the International Atomic Energy
Agency or other intergovernmental organizations send supplies in the
performance of their tasks (Art. 4(2)(b) ICT) and, second, where “the transfer
is linked to humanitarian aid in the case of disaster or as a donation in an
emergency” (Art. 4(2)(d) ICT). As indicated above, there are no similar
circumstances otherwise requiring mandatory use of a general licence.
Concerning the first circumstance, whilst supplier or recipient status as an
international body does not automatically eliminate security and export
diversion risks, such risks are likely to be limited in transfers between allies as
opposed to a recipient who is a private economic operator. Yet, according to
the latest study, only eight Member States provide full exemption; five provide
partial exemption with some countries specifying only a few organizations or
NATO only.143 Concerning the second circumstance, in addition to enabling
expeditious transfer, references to disasters and donations suggest that the
material in question will not raise major security concerns. This exemption is
also consistent with the EU’s humanitarian obligations.144 However, again,
only ten Member States provide full exemption; two provide partial exemption
with one country only exempting government donations and the other limiting
equipment to rescue equipment.145
More problematic are two circumstances permitting optional exemption
from prior authorization which, broadly construed, cover the same
circumstances that Member States must otherwise subject to mandatory
general licensing. The first is where the supplier or recipient is a government
body or part of the armed forces (Art. 4(2)(a) ICT). This is similar to the
mandatory ground for use of a general licence discussed above.146 The second
is where the transfer is necessary for or after repair, maintenance, exhibition
or demonstration (Art. 4(2)(e) ICT). Again, this is similar to the mandatory
ground for use of a general licence discussed above.147 As to the government
body and armed forces exemption, a similar rationale applies to that of
143. Technopolis report, supra note 4, at 31–32, Table 13. 11 countries provided no
exemption. For a breakdown of exemptions applied in national legislation, see Appendix H and
SWD(2016)398 final/2, at 15–16.
144. Arts. 208–211 TFEU.
145. 12 countries provided no exemption. See sources cited supra note 143.
146. Art. 5(2)(a) ICT. See section 4.3.1. supra.
147. Art. 5(2)(c) and (d) ICT. See section 4.3.1. supra.
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exemption of transfers by international organizations. It is reported that only
eight Member States provide full exemption; nine provide partial exemption
with many countries limiting its scope to use by the other Member State when
its forces are being deployed abroad.148 As to the demonstration to repair
exemption, this reflects the general reality that products at the
pre/post-production stage carry a lower risk. It is reported that only five
Member States provide full exemption and only five provide partial
exemption, covering movement in only one direction or certain activities.149
Member States may exempt from licensing transfers necessary for the
implementation of a “cooperative armament programme between Member
States” (Art. 4(2)(c) ICT; see section 2.2.2 above). It is reported that only
seven Member States have provided full exemption.150 This “half-way”
position between exemption and permitted use of general licensing for
defence cooperation reflects both the importance and flexibility attributed to
cooperative programmes under the Defence Package as a whole. Directive
2009/81/EC similarly provides for exclusion of cooperative programmes from
its award procedures.151 A transfer licence exemption is broadly consistent
with such objectives, although, as indicated above, the extent to which
intergovernmental cooperation should be subject to, or excluded from, the
ICT requires clarification.
The correspondence between certain circumstances permitting optional
exemption and those requiring mandatory or permitted general licensing begs
the question as to whether a revised ICT could be recalibrated. Firstly, the two
circumstances providing optional exemption from prior authorization which
are not also covered by general licences i.e. international organization and
humanitarian transfers could be categorically excluded.152 Secondly, the
armed forces and demonstration to repair circumstances, which are subject to
general licences but which also correspond to circumstances permitting
optional exemption, could be presumptively excluded from prior
authorization altogether. This could mean total licence-free liberalization
perhaps subject only to possible prior authorization if a public policy or public
security reason can be established.153 This would send a clearer signal that
148. 7 countries have no exemption. See sources cited supra note 143.
149. Technopolis report, supra note 4 at 31–32, Table 13 and 33. 14 countries provided no
exemption. See sources cited supra note 143.
150. There are no partial exemptions. See sources cited supra note 143.
151. See Art. 13(c) Directive 2009/81/EC. For a discussion of this provision, see Trybus,
op. cit. supra note 2, pp. 283–288.
152. This would not necessarily preclude the possibility for Member States to justify a
licensing requirement based on Art. 36 or 346 TFEU.
153. Concerning cooperative programmes, there may be a case for the use of a licence if the
programme concerns sensitive research and development (R&D).
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such “low-risk” transfers should operate in a uniform licence-free zone unless
it can be established that prior authorization is necessary in exceptional cases.
As indicated above, given that any form of licensing requirement is generally
considered to be a restriction on the Internal Market, the fewer circumstances
subject to licensing the better.154 At present, the current portfolio of optional
exemptions indicates flexibility but also a certain ambivalence as to the
baseline at which to set harmonization.155 This has caused further uncertainty
in national implementation. According to the latest study, there was
“widespread confusion” among competent authorities in differentiating the
circumstances permitting exemptions and the mandatory grounds for general
licences.156
The 2016 Evaluation Report considers a possible revision of the ICT with
regard to the exemptions, “such as: making exemptions binding on Member
States and enlarging the scope of exemptions”.157 However, this is only
considered in the “long run”, not proposed in the Report itself, and no details
are given concerning which exemptions could be revised.
4.4. Global transfer licences
As indicated above, the global licence is in between the extremes of a general
licence and individual licence. Its main simplification potential is that it is not
specific to a precise shipment and, thus, can be used several times to cover
similar transfers; global transfer licences are typically not subject to
quantitative limits and are valid over a long period.158 Historically, global
licences have been considered useful for routine shipments to habitual
customers or for SMEs with limited catalogues.159 Their potential had already
been realized in certain Member States before the ICT.160
154. Perhaps even more radically, it may be asked whether it would be possible to introduce
requirements short of licensing to ensure that such transfers are subject to at least some form of
monitoring provided such monitoring does not, itself, infringe EU law. See section 2.2. supra.
155. Art. 5(2) ICT enumerating the circumstances requiring mandatory general licences
simply indicates that it is “without prejudice to Article 4(2)” enumerating the list of optional
exemptions from prior authorization.
156. Technopolis report, supra note 4, at Appendix G, at 108 stating that this was
“presumably not helped by the similar categories given for each in the Directive”.
157. COM(2016)760 final, at 12.
158. Impact Assessment, supra note 6, at 35 and 36.
159. Ibid., at 35. See also GRIP study, supra note 7, at 39.
160. GRIP study, ibid. In 2002, France introduced global licences based on a catalogue of
participating companies, specifically targeting SMEs. See Impact Assessment, supra note 6, at
36. The first 35 licences replaced 1,250 individual licences, a reduction in administrative
bureaucracy by a factor of 36. Similarly, during the ICT’s preparatory phase, Romania indicated
that it had replaced 700 individual licences with 7 global licences, ibid.
CML Rev. 2017428 Trybus and Butler
However, the intended effect of global licences is uncertain and difficult to
discern in light of no or limited information having been communicated
regarding their implementation and application under the ICT.161 First, the
underlying rationale for global licences is now unclear. The Commission
opted against a “global licences only” approach because a combination of
general and global licences would enable general licences for routine
non-sensitive transfers while also accommodating the necessary flexibility
for more sensitive transfers through global licences.162 Therefore, whilst
global licences were formerly used to cover routine shipments of less sensitive
products in great quantity over a long period, it now appears that global
licences should be used to cover less routine shipments of more sensitive
products over a maximum period of three years.163 Second, in contrast to
general and individual licences, the ICT does not prescribe circumstances for
use of global licences.164 Third, Member States must determine the products
or categories of products covered and the authorized recipients, again,
indicating considerable discretion in the use of such licences (Art. 6(2) ICT).
It is argued that this does not make the global licence the intended “default”
type of licence under the ICT. If this had been the EU legislature’s intention,
more detailed provision on global licences would have been included.
Possibly global licences are intended merely as a transitional measure until
general licences are fully operational.165
The Commission had acknowledged a small risk that Member States may
define global licences in such restrictive terms as to be equivalent to individual
licences, but states that there is little reason to fear such abuses as a Member
State would compromise the competitive position of its industries.166
However, this does presuppose that competition rather than national security
or some other motive will be the primary determinant when making licensing
decisions. Nevertheless, global licences could be relied on, in particular, by
161. Transposition Report supra note 7, at 10. In the UK, these are the equivalent of Open
Individual Export Licence (OIELs). See generally, Notice to Exporters 2012/37 supra note 97,
at 3.
162. Impact Assessment, supra note 6, at 36.
163. Art. 6(2). Admittedly, Art. 6(2) ICT provides that this period may be renewed although
does not identify a minimum or maximum length of renewal.The UK’s latest guidance suggests
that the limitation of global licences to only three years constitutes a “significant difference” to
previous UK practice. See Notice to Exporters 2012/37 supra note 97, at 3.
164. Rather, Recital 26 ICT simply states that “[w]here a general transfer licence cannot be
published, Member states should, upon request, grant a global transfer licence… except in the
case set out in this Directive…”.
165. GRIP study, supra note 7, at 39.
166. Ibid.
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small businesses used to such licences in order to avoid the perceived
administrative and resource burdens of the certification regime under general
licences.167 The latest report indicates that between 2012–2014, there was a
slight increase in the use of global licences,168 but the 2016 Evaluation Report
suggests that global licences constitute less than 5 per cent of transfers.169
If global licences are transitional, it is suggested that the ICT should provide
an illustrative list of circumstances in which a global licence must or can be
used. This is necessary to clarify the role of global licences as an alternative to
general and individual licences. Either way, the current provisions on global
licences look somewhat brief and basic when compared to the more detailed
general and individual licensing provisions.
4.5. The details: licence form, registration, terms, conditions and supplier
information
The ICT neither prescribes any particular documentary form for general
licences nor their publication in specific locations.According to recent reports
on implementation of the ICT, general licences are often difficult to access,
available in different documentary formats varying in length, published in
languages other than English, and not generally available through national
websites.170 Public visibility is integral to the ICT’s credibility among its
users. A revised ICT could introduce further harmonization to address some
of these issues e.g. by specifying a common language and format or template.
A more complex issue would be the centralization of electronic access to
general licence information.171
Even if suppliers can overcome difficulties experienced regarding
documentation, before granting a general licence, a Member State may lay
down conditions for registration prior to first use.172 Member States thus
retain considerable discretion to define procedures for registration173 and
167. EP report “The impact …”, cited supra note 7, at 49 and fn95. See section 6 infra.
168. An increase of approximately 18 %. A total of approximately 500–600 global licences
were issued each year during this period. See Technopolis report, supra note 4, Appendix G, at
113–114 and Table 49 for a further breakdown. SWD(2016) 398 final/2, at 19 only mentions
“year on year increases”.
169. COM(2016) 760 final, at 5.
170. GRIP study, supra note 7, at 19 and 20.
171. Ibid., suggests a potential designated module for general licences on the CERTIDER
website given that this is a central information point for certification, on which see section 6
infra.
172. E.g., in the UK most OGELs require the exporter or trader to register before making
use of licences, see supra note 161.
173. For a discussion of Member State registration practices under the ICT, see Technopolis
report, supra note 4, Appendix K, at 160-2 and 165-7.
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de-registration, the latter not mentioned at all in the ICT. Again, a revised ICT
could introduce further harmonization.174
In addition, whilst certain terms and conditions may protect legitimate
public policy or security concerns, it is recalled that Member States continue
to exercise discretion to determine all terms and conditions (Art. 4(6) ICT).
Post-transposition practice indicates that Member States continue to rely on a
diversity of terms and conditions most, if not all, of which appear to be
disproportionate.175 Therefore, many of the criticisms predating the ICT
regime continue to apply. This is a highly sensitive issue which Member States
may perceive to be a matter falling within the discretion of national transfer
policies. Nevertheless, a revised ICT could seek to place certain explicit
controls on licensing conditions e.g. to ensure that such terms and conditions
are reasonable and proportionate to the transfer in question. Conversely, there
has been some minimum harmonization of information required of suppliers.
The ICT provides that Member States must require suppliers to provide a
range of information regarding the transfer.176 However, beyond this
minimum, Member States can also determine additional information that may
be required, again, creating potential divergences in requirements imposed.177
5. End-use controls
As indicated above, concerns regarding the illicit export of transferred goods
into rogue hands or conflict zones in third countries remain a prevalent issue.
This has conditioned the ICT’s approach to transfers and provided the greatest
scope for Member State discretion. Whilst ex ante controls are no longer
possible through routine recourse to individual licences, even general licences
retain the possibility for ex post controls ensuring that any export restriction
174. This is not expressly considered in the 2016 Evaluation Report, COM(2016)760 final.
175. For instance, the GRIP study identifies French practice in which general licences have
incorporated technical clauses requiring either the supplier or recipient to make specific
alterations to the product before shipping it as well as specific conditions attached to each
category of product. See supra note 7, at 36–37.
176. Member States must ensure that suppliers inform: recipients of the terms and
conditions of the transfer licence (including limitations relating to end-use) (Art. 8(1) ICT);
within a reasonable time, the competent authorities of the originating Member State of their
intention to use a general licence for the first time (Art. 8(2) ICT); and regularly check that
suppliers keep detailed records of their transfers and determine the reporting requirements
attached to the use of a licence (whether general, global or individual) (Art. 8(2) ICT).
177. Art. 8(2) ICT. France has even reserved the right to conduct a preliminary interview
with the supplier prior to transfer. See EP report “The impact …”, cited supra note 7, at 47 fn.
88. On the application of information requirements, see Technopolis report, supra note 4,
Appendix K, at 163.
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on the defence good issued by the Member State of origin “follows the
transferred good”.178 As this section will demonstrate, it is with regard to
export controls on transferred goods that the limits of the ICT’s harmonization
objectives are most apparent.
5.1. Limitations prior to transfer
The ICT provides that Member States may not only include any limitations on
exports to third countries in their transfer licences but may also “avail
themselves”, i.e. positively take advantage, of the possibility to request
end-use assurances including end-use certificates.179
As indicated above, the ICT does not intend to impact on Member States’
export control policies. Member State export measures are, however, to some
extent, guided by the EU Council Common Position 2008/944/CFSP defining
common rules governing military exports including a User Guide indicating
best practice on the use of end-user certificates (“EUCs”). However, end-use
obligations and documentation currently vary greatly.180 Member States
continue to require EUCs for individual and global licences.181 By contrast,
Member States do not seem to require EUCs for transfers under a general
licence but do generally include certain end-use restrictions, such as
non-re-export clauses, notification requirements, and clauses requiring
components to be integrated.182 Member States also impose a range of
post-shipment controls, such as delivery verification certificates (“DVCs”)
and end-use monitoring.183 Ultimately, most Member States wish to maintain
end-use controls for both third country exports and intra-Union transfers. A
significant reason is that Member States have pre-existing commitments
under international control regimes concerning controls on end-use. Further,
there is still a concern that export policies “vary quite widely” among Member
States, which might constitute a risk where an importing Member State is an
intermediary for export of transferred goods to a third country.184
178. Impact Assessment, supra note 6, at 41.
179. Art. 4(6) ICT. This language is arcane and should be clarified in a subsequent revision
of the ICT.
180. GRIP study, supra note 7, at 54–56.
181. Ibid., at 55 and 60.
182. Ibid., at 56–57 observes that a non-re-export clause is always included. Some clauses
prohibit re-export without prior written authorization by the original exporting country. Some
also permit re-export without prior authorization to certain allied third countries.
183. Ibid., at 58–59. Several Member States do not require DVCs for transfers within the
EU and, where required, these are only used under individual licences: ibid., at 58.
184. Ibid., at 59.
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At the very least, it is arguable that the ICT fails to distinguish sufficiently
between intra-Union transfers which do not involve exports to third countries
and those which do. For instance, Article 4(8) provides that Member States
must not impose any export limitations for components where the recipient
provides a declaration of use that the components are, or are to be, integrated
into its own products and cannot at a later stage be transferred or exported as
such, unless for the purposes of maintenance or repair.185 However, Member
States may impose export limitations if the transfer of components is
determined to be “sensitive” (Art. 4(7) ICT). As indicated above,
distinguishing between sensitive and non-sensitive transfers may prove
difficult for the purposes of determining which licence a product should be
subject to, let alone whether a transfer should be subject to export
limitations.186 This raises further questions as to whether “sensitivity” is an
effective criterion for application in this context.
Some Member States have indicated that controls on intra-Union transfers
could be less restrictive than controls on exports. Whilst there is continued
support for global and individual licence transfers to retain EUC
requirements, a majority of Member States are in favour of their
harmonization. The difficulty at this stage is that Member States do not have
a common vision of what form this would take and continue to express
concern regarding the need for a case-by-case assessment in light of the
diversity of end-use(r)s.187 An open question is whether, in cases in which an
end-user is a certified company receiving products under a general licence
without prospect of export, any end-use guarantee should be considered
disproportionate. In other words, certification itself might be considered the
equivalent of an end-use guarantee.188 However, this equivalence may be
questioned on the basis that certification simply provides a determination that
185. See also Recital 19 ICT. Member State practice indicates that general licences may
incorporate integration clauses or declarations, or statements certifying to this effect and that
certain Member States have used these sorts of statements as an alternative to the use of a
non-re-export clause: GRIP study, supra note 7, at 36.
186. Whilst (see section 4.3.2. supra) the ICT does not include any guidance regarding the
sensitivity of products,Art. 4(7) identifies two criteria for determining sensitivity: (a) the nature
of the components and any end-use of the finished products which might give rise to concern;
and (b) the significance of the components in relation to the products in which they are to be
incorporated.
187. GRIP study, supra note 7, at 60–61. This also means that harmonization of
post-shipment controls is currently “inconceivable”.
188. Ibid., at 60 reporting that only one Member State expressed this opinion and that: “it
should be underlined here that this understanding of the certification as an alternative to the
EUC is not a shared interpretation among Member States. However, this issue should definitely
be discussed among Member States.”
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a company is reliable i.e. has capacity to observe export limitations on
products transferred under a general licence.189 Certification is not a legal
guarantee that specified goods will not be exported. It thus remains unclear
whether further revision of the certification regime could more clearly
differentiate between intra-EU transfers involving exports to third countries
and those which do not.
5.2. Limitations prior to export
Corresponding to the limitations placed on transfers through the imposition of
terms and conditions and end-use obligations on licences regarding export,
Article 10 ICT requires recipients of transferred products to declare to their
competent authorities that they have complied with any export limitations
attached to the licence,190 including having obtained the required consent
from the originating Member State. However, because it is the recipient’s
responsibility to declare and inform their authority, the ICT lacks any
systematic means by which receiving Member States are routinely informed
about relevant re-export conditions.191 Consequently, the ICT fails to
safeguard against the risk of unauthorized export in cases where recipients
intentionally or inadvertently neglect to inform their authorities.192 The
Commission had originally considered an IT traceability database that would
track licences and export restrictions but this option was considered to be less
cost-efficient than the information requirements finally adopted.193
Notwithstanding this uncertainty, Article 10 ICT is not the only available
safeguard. First, Member States may withdraw, suspend or limit the use of
licences issued at any time on four grounds: protection of essential security
interests; public policy; public security; and non-compliance with licence
terms and conditions (Art. 4(9) ICT). Secondly, as indicated below,
certification is one means of addressing export control concerns. Thirdly, a
licensing Member State may provisionally suspend a general licence where
there is a “serious risk” that a certified recipient will not comply with a licence
condition, or that public policy, public security or its essential security could
189. The authors are grateful to Baudouin Heuninckx for this observation. See further
section 6 infra.
190. Recitals 34, 35, 36 and Art. 10 ICT. This corresponds with a prior obligation to ensure
that suppliers inform recipients of end-use or export limitations. See Recital 31 and Art. 8(1)
ICT.
191. Taylor, “EC Defence Equipment Directives”, Standard Note SN/IA/4640, 3 June
2011, House of Commons Library, 20 citing at fn. 49 Committee on Arms Export Controls,
Scrutiny of Arms Export Controls 2009, HC 178, Session 2008-09.
192. Ibid.
193. Impact Assessment, supra note 6, at 47.
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be affected (Art. 15(1) and (2) ICT). Fourthly, the ICT contains provisions on
customs procedures to ensure a further final check on exports (Art. 11(1)).
Finally, Member States may lay down penalties for infringements, in
particular, in the event of false or incomplete information provided
concerning compliance with export limitations.194 It is important that these
provisions do not create divergent national practices on compliance and
sanctioning.
6. Certification
The ICT requires Member States to use general licences where the recipient is
a certified undertaking (Art. 5(2)(b)); thus, the introduction of a certification
regime is the second fundamental innovation of the ICT.195 Certification
concerns the assessment of the reliability of a prospective recipient of
defence-related products under a general licence. Certification is conducted in
the Member State in which the recipient is registered according to common
criteria before any transfer takes place. The principal rationale is to ensure, in
particular, the capacity of the recipient to comply with export limitations
placed on transferred products.196 Certain Member States operated their own
national certification systems before the ICT.197 However, the need for
common principles and mutual recognition required existing national
processes to be overhauled.
6.1. Optional certification and mutual recognition
The legislature decided to establish a regime based on optional rather than
mandatory certification.198 One significant argument against mandatory
certification concerned the need for undertakings to weigh the costs and
benefits in light of the manageable but still considerable certification costs.199
194. Art. 16 ICT. See also Recital 38 ICT.
195. The first innovation is the move from individual to general and global licences,
discussed section 4 supra.
196. Recital 33 and Art. 9(2) ICT. See also 2016 Evaluation Report COM(2016)760 final,
at 4, first paragraph.
197. French companies must obtain a “licence for manufacturing and trading” whilst UK
companies are invited to implement a “compliance programme for exporters”: Impact
Assessment, supra note 6, at 37.
198. Impact Assessment, ibid., at 26–27 and 37–40.
199. Data collected during the consultation phase from stakeholders suggests annual costs
of about ¤10,000 per company: Impact Assessment, supra note 6, at 38–40. See also Recital
32 ICT.
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The ICT singles out the potential for certification to benefit transfers within a
group of undertakings where members of the group are certified in their
respective Member States of establishment.200 At the very least, optional
certification may incentivize Member States to grant general licences in light
of the guarantees provided by certified reliability.201 It may also foster the
conditions for mutual trust leading to mutual recognition of certificates
attesting reliability; for instance, Article 9(6) ICT provides that Member
States must recognize any certificates issued in another Member State.
6.2. Competent authorities
Article 9(1) ICT requires Member States to designate competent authorities to
certify recipients on their territory under general licences published by other
Member States. The fact that, prior to the ICT, departments other than defence
(e.g. ministries of industry or economy) were often in charge of certification
was an argument against the adoption of a transfer regime under the auspices
of the European Defence Agency (EDA), which is seen as an agency of
Member States’ ministries of defence.202 At present, the fact that certification
is optional may reduce any appetite among Member States for the
centralization of certification under a unit within the Commission or the EDA,
for example. However, the certification regime is already undergoing a
process of centralization. According to Article 9(8) ICT, Member States must
publish and regularly update a list of certified recipients and inform the
Commission, the European Parliament and the other Member States. Further,
the Commission must make publicly available on its website a central register
of recipients certified by Member States and has created a central register or
this purpose.203 In the long term, the arguments for and against further
centralization under an EU institution could be explored as a means to build
further trust beyond mutual recognition.
200. See Recital 3 ICT.
201. Impact Assessment, supra note 6, at 40.
202. Ibid., at 18. See also Transposition Report, supra note 7, at 10.
203. The Commission’s Register of Certified Defence-related Enterprises (CERTIDER)
<ec.europa.eu/growth/tools-databases/certider/index.cfm> (last visited 30 Jan. 2017) provides
information about enterprises certified under the ICT, contains a list of the competent national
authorities designated to deal with certification, the list of certified enterprises, details about
the certificates and links to relevant national legislation. According to the GRIP study, most but
not all Member States refer to the EU’s list of certified recipients and several Member States
specifically require the supplier to verify, on the EU website, whether the beneficiary holds a
valid certificate (supra note 7, at 33 indicating, however, that the UK authorities refer to a list of
certified companies available on a UK website). It is submitted that a guidance note or a revised
ICT could specify that all references should refer to the EU list of certified recipients.
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6.3. Certification criteria, certification and publication
As indicated, the ICT introduces what appears to be exhaustive common
certification criteria to establish the recipient’s reliability.204 The ICT also
prescribes the minimum mandatory information to be contained in certificates
(Art. 9(3)(a)-(d)). Member States may also provide that certificates contain
further conditions relating to the provision of information required to verify
compliance with the reliability criteria and concerning suspension or
revocation of the certificate (Art. 9(4) ICT). In addition, authorities must
monitor the recipient’s compliance with the criteria and any further conditions
at least every three years.205 Finally, the validity of a certificate must not
exceed five years (Art. 9(3)(2) ICT). Therefore, notwithstanding common
certification criteria, it is unclear whether Member States may: issue
certificates for less than five years up to the maximum; differ in terms of the
nature and level of information required to verify compliance; and monitor
compliance more often than every three years.
To ensure further convergence in the applicable certification criteria, the
Commission has published Recommendation 2011/24/EU206 setting out
common certification guidelines; however, these may, in fact, create further
diversity of national measures contrary to the ICT’s intended objectives. The
guidelines not only amplify existing provisions but also leave scope for
Member States to add further requirements, the proportionality of which
might be questioned. It is not clear what has motivated a non-legally binding
instrument; perhaps the most likely reason is the fact that certification is
optional. Whatever the reason, the Recommendation was not specifically
envisaged or enabled by the ICT. Section 6.5 below questions the continuing
emphasis on such soft-law guidance in furthering harmonization.
6.4. Non-compliance
If a competent authority determines that a certified recipient on its territory is
no longer compliant, it must take “appropriate measures”, which may include
204. These include inter alia: experience of, and compliance with, export restrictions See
Art. 9(2)(a)-(f) ICT.
205. Art, 9(5) ICT. This provides an additional safeguard to that provided in Art. 8(3) ICT
which requires Member States to regularly check that suppliers keep detailed and complete
records of their transfers.
206. Commission Recommendation 2011/24/EU of 11 Jan. 2011 on the certification of
defence undertakings under Art. 9 of Directive 2009/43/EC of the European Parliament and of
the Council simplifying terms and conditions of transfers of defence-related products within the
Community, O.J. 2011, L 11/62. The Recommendation was developed by the working group
under the Committee procedure in Art. 14 ICT.
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suspension or revocation of the certificate (Art. 9(4)(b) and (7) ICT).
Uncertainty in determining what might constitute non-compliance and
appropriate action may result in authorities simply opting for automatic
revocation or suspension without considering less severe corrective measures.
There is no provision in the ICT for Member States to achieve a relative degree
of uniformity in approach, other than an obligation to inform the Commission
and other Member States of the decision taken(Art. 9(7)). Recommendation
2011/24/EU provides some indication as to how to proceed in assessing
non-compliance, appropriate measures and determinations and time limits
regarding the lifting, maintaining or revoking of suspensions.207 On issues that
might be considered to fall within national procedural autonomy, principles of
proportionality and effective judicial protection will need to provide a residual
safeguard.
6.5. Transposition, implementation, and impact
According to the latest study, all Member States have defined their national
certification systems in compliance with the ICT.208 However, there has been
a limited uptake in practice.209 Firstly, companies, in particular, SMEs,
express “serious doubts” about the benefits of certification given the time,
risks, potential for intellectual property and security breaches, and
organizational and financial requirements necessary to prepare procedures,
controls and audits for compliance.210 Secondly, there are potentially
unknown costs and risks; for example, concern has been expressed regarding
the certification criterion which requires a senior officer to be personally
responsible for transfers and exports.211 These are exacerbated by the
uncertain scope of application of general licences as well as the fact that it is
not mandatory to publish licences and certifications in a common language
207. See e.g. paras. 4.1 and 4.3.
208. Technopolis report, supra note 4, at 35. See also SWD(2016)398 final/2, at 21–22.
COM(2016)760 final, at 4, however, points out that one Member State “is yet to introduce a
fully operable scheme for certifying defence enterprises” and that “[n]o complete information
is available for all Member States” on this matter.
209. GRIP study, supra note 7, at 43 and COM(2016)760 final, at 4, 5, 6, 9, and 11, which
points out at 10 that certification is the only issue for which there was sufficient data.
210. Technopolis report, supra note 4, at 40 and 44; COM(2016)760 final, at 6 and 9;
SWD(2016)398 final/2, at 23.
211. Thanks to officials in the UK Dept. of Business, Innovation and Skills, for discussing
the extent to which this is an issue within the export community as compliance programmes
become increasingly sophisticated, although this was not expressed as a UK specific concern.
See also GRIP study, supra note 7, at 44 and COM(2016)760 final, at 6.
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such as English.212 Thirdly, in certain Member States a certificate may be
limited in its scope e.g. to receive only certain categories of products.213
Overall, only 55 enterprises have been certified, half of which are located in
just two Member States.214 Further, only six per cent of applications for
registration to use general licences relate to certified recipients.215
The study supporting the Commission’s Evaluation Report recommended,
and the 2016 Evaluation Report considers, the future introduction of detailed
implementation guides on certification based on the Recommendation.216
Equivocally, it is stated that these guides should be implemented in the form
of a “non-mandatory accompanying procedure” that is “outside of the
Directive” and which is to be preferred because it would take less time to
negotiate than guidelines “linked directly to the Directive”.217 Conversely, it is
argued that further soft-law guidance unaccompanied by legal reform may
have the opposite effect of leading to even more variable implementation. The
co-existence of a legally binding instrument and a non-legally binding
Recommendation need not compromise legal certainty if the latter is a
principled amplification of the former. However, it should not be a substitute
for adequate legal provision in the ICT, which is arguably the case at present.
The 2016 Evaluation Report is accompanied by a further Recommendation
regarding certified companies.218 It also identifies proposals for guidance on
certification in future, in addition to even softer approaches such as a
handbook, outreach in network meetings, and expanding CERTIDER;
however, whilst the Evaluation Report identifies the possibility of “revising
the certification scheme” in the “longer run”, it provides no indication of its
potential based on the current legal configuration of the scheme.219 Caution
must be exercised against substantially extending the certification provisions,
given the ICT’s minimum harmonization objective, the fact that certification
is optional as well as the fact that the very purpose of certification is to reduce
regulatory controls as a complement to general licences. Nevertheless,
212. According to the GRIP study, ibid., at 46, the administrative burdens and lack of
information on general licences led some SMEs to use individual and global licences.
Conversely, the latest report indicates that SMEs represent 63 % of users of general licences for
transfers to certified recipients. Technopolis report, supra note 4, at Appendix G, at 117. On
cost versus benefit generally, ibid., at 35 and Appendix K, at 175.
213. Ibid., Appendix K, at 153.
214. Technopolis report, supra note 4, at 173. See also COM(2016)760 final, at 6 referring
to Germany and France. Half of the Member States have no certified companies. According to
SWD(2016)398 final/2, at 23 the estimated number of certified enterprises is 53.
215. Technopolis report, ibid., at 114.
216. Ibid., at 81 and Appendix K, at 154 and COM(2016)760 final, at 11.
217. Technopolis report, ibid., at 81 and Appendix K, at 154.
218. C(2016)7728 final. Cf. discussion in section 3 supra.
219. COM(2016)760 final, at 11 and 12, and 12–13.
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clarification and slight expansion of the certification provisions could
encourage an uptake in general licences.220
7. Conclusions
The ICT is an important weapon in the “Defence Package”, cutting through
the fog of hazy claims that national security always justifies licensing. Whilst
it is possible to debate the extent to which legitimate security risks arise from
intra-EU transfers, they pose a substantially lower risk than third country
exports. The ICT’s main innovations are: (1) a transition away from individual
licences towards general licences with defence products defined by the CML
and subject to reduced ex ante controls; (2) certification of recipients; and
(3) ex post controls on third country exports. This article has argued that an
ambivalent approach to harmonization has contributed significantly to the
ICT’s limited operational effectiveness. The borderline between optional
exemption from prior authorization and mandatory licences is unclear, as is
the co-existence of legally and non-legally binding instruments. Moreover,
Member States still determine their transfer and export control policies.
Consequently, an overriding export control mentality is pervasive, as
evidenced by continuing preference for individual licences and restrictively
defined general licences. The certification regime is similarly unclear. Legal
reform is necessary to achieve minimum harmonization in preference to
further harmonization exclusively through soft law.
However, it is important to acknowledge the difficulties at present. The
2016 evaluation, required by Article 17 ICT, only draws on a few years’
practice; the Commission was, perhaps understandably, reluctant to propose
legal reform even though the evaluation is intended to provide the basis for a
legislative proposal, if necessary.221 Therefore, the issues so far identified
provide institutional learning for future revisions and should not be taken as an
indication of failure. More fundamentally, the exercise of EU competence
renders the ICT susceptible to the same kinds of difficulties encountered
when exercising any new competence for the first time: legislators and
stakeholders must adapt, and mutual trust and recognition only grow over
time. At the current stage of EU defence integration, intra-EU transfers are
220. Just one example would be clarity around the requirement for a designated officer to
be “personally responsible”, which, at present is only likely to make authorities even more risk
averse.
221. COM(2016)760 final, at 2: “only three years after the transposition deadline [it is]
difficult to assess whether the long-term objectives of the Directive have been achieved.” Cf.
also SWD(2016)398 final/2, at 6 and 13.
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still considered to present security risks which legitimate certain controls.
Over time, Member States need to ensure that licensing decisions are a true
reflection of risk. Whilst a licence-free Europe may never be possible, the ICT,
backed with institutional support, may lead to a quasi-Internal Market for
defence goods with fewer licences.
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